In this paper I address the problem of the unrealisticness of assumptions in neoclassical economics 2
In (1981) Musgrave noted that in the F-twist " [...] Friedman defended the apparently absurd view that `unreal assumptions` are not a vice but virtue." (Musgrave, 1981: 377 )" This argument "sparked a vigorous controversy which has continued right up to the present day" (Musgrave, 1981: 377) . Starting from Friedman's argument Musgrave argued that Friedman failed to "distinguish between three different types of assumptions, each of which makes a different type of assertion and therefore plays a different role in a theory" (Musgrave, 1981: 378 ) So, starting from the different functions that assumptions could hold in a model, Musgrave identified the negligibility assumptions, the domain assumptions and the heuristic assumptions. The first type, the negligibility assumptions concern the impact of a factor F "which might be expected to affect (a) phenomenon (but) actually has no effect upon it, or at least no detectable effect." (Musgrave, 1981: 378) . The vacuum assumption from Friedman`s example of falling bodies could be an example of such assumptions: "the effect of air resistance is negligible" (Musgrave, 1981: 378) Of course not all the factors not stated in a model are in fact negligibility assumptions. Musgrave assumed that we did not
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usually have explicitly stated assumptions about the negligibility of factors like the day of the week on which the experiment was performed or about the experimenter's eyes color. "Negligibility assumptions are stated only for factors which might be expected to have some effect but which, we claim, will not." (Musgrave, 1981: 378) The second class, the domain assumptions specify the domain of a theory. Musgrave formulated this as a second step assumption: "What begins as a negligibility assumption, when it gets refuted, turn into a domain assumption" (Musgrave, 1981: 381] . So if a negligibility assumption that a factor F has negligible effect is proved to be false, the domain of the theory may be restricted. The researcher "may retain the assumption that F is absent, but now use it to specify the domain of applicability of his theory" (Musgrave, 1981: 381) Musgrave argued further that this radical change in a given theory could "go unnoticed because the same form of words is used to express both assumptions. An economist who says 'assume the government has a balanced budget' may mean that any actual budget imbalance can be ignored because its effects on the phenomena he is investigating are negligible. But he may also mean precisely the opposite: that budget imbalance would have significant effects, so that his theory will only apply where such an imbalance does not exist" (Musgrave, 1981: 381 (Musgrave,1981: 382,383) .
In (2000) Mäki labeled Musgrave's (1981) taxonomy of assumptions as successful "because it clarifies certain aspects of the assumptions controversy" (Mäki, 2000: 317) and argued that further clarifications were needed. First of them concerned the negligibility assumptions and Musgrave`s formulation of it. Mäki noted that what was surprising about Musgrave`s definition "is that it does not mention the idea of negligibility at all; it talks about detectability" (Mäki, 2000: 319 (Mäki, 2000: 320] . Another problem was | 72 that a factor which had no effect was not a factor with a negligible effect. Mäki argued that "while negligibility is a context-specific notion [...] there is no context-specific [...] about a factor having no effect" (Mäki, 2000: 322] . So, a no-effect factor was irrelevant not negligible. Therefore we got an adequate definition: "A negligibility assumption is the hypothesis that some factor F that might be expected to affect the phenomenon under investigation actually has an effect upon it small enough to be neglected relative to a given purpose" (Mäki, 2000: 322) . Starting from this new definition Mäki argued like Musgrave that "It is good for the theory -including its predictive abilities -if they (the negligibility assumptions) are true" (Mäki, 2000: 322 (Mäki, 2000: 324) . Reading between Musgrave`s lines, Mäki decided that he intended to talk about DB. Starting from this observation, Mäki suggested that actually it was DB* that would better express a domain assumption. From this, in order to have a domain assumption in Musgrave's spirit (but not in its form) we must have a statement about reality (the government has a balanced budget) and a meta-statement (the theory applies only where ...). At this point Mäki makes a distinction between domain assumption (first kind of statement) and applicability assumption (the second kind). For example: "the assumption that the agents' behavior is solely calculative and self-seeking may serve as a domain assumption, while the assumption that that assumption applies to market behavior but not -or alternatively: as well as -to political or family behavior, is an applicability assumption" (Mäki, 2000: 325) . Finally, Mäki analyzes the third of Musgrave's assumptions, the heuristic ones. They should be understood in a dynamic context and could be labeled as first step assumptions or early step assumptions. Actually what we have is an assumption and a promise of forthcoming relaxation the form of the following sentences: "(B): `The government has a balanced budget` (and) E-SB: `(B) is an element in an early formulation of the theory and will be removed as the theory is developed`" (Mäki, 2000: 326) . So what we need is to acknowledge the necessity of a metastatement as in the case of the domain-applicability assumptions. From the preceding clarifications, Mäki critically argues that even though the first two kinds of assumptions "had better be true", in the case of early step assumptions, Musgrave's conclusion does not hold. His argument goes something like the following: first, an early step assumption | 73 involves a false negligibility assumption. Second, this negligibility assumption must be supplemented with a promise that the falseness will be removed in a later step. From this, Mäki argues against Musgrave's conclusion that negligibility assumption needs to be true. If the first step needs to be true then it would be incoherent to say that in a later step the false negligibility assumption will be relaxed to a true one. I believe this argument aims to a potential problem with Musgrave's conclusion, rather than to an actual one. As Mäki acknowledged, Musgrave's statement of the heuristic assumptions was not very clear. Another reading of this type (other than Mäki's) of assumption could be that if there is an assumption with heuristic value, then in the first stage we could employ a false negligibility assumption, while in the second stage we could not make another false negligibility assumption. I believe this is the correct reading of Musgrave's intentions. Two stages of false negligibility assumptions do not make much sense, and Musgrave does not seem to be unable to understand that.
In (2005), (2006), Hindriks analyzed the Musgrave-Mäki battle of assumptions and made several corrections. Hindriks (2005) noted that Mäki`s suggestions and changes in Musgrave`s typology must be seen as improvements in need for further amendments. First, Hindriks distinguished between first order and second order assumptions. A first order assumption is, for example, one that assumes that "a certain factor F has no effect on the phenomenon under investigation" (Hindriks, 2005: 391) . A second order assumption on the other hand, "provides reasons for imposing first-order assumptions" (Hindriks, 2005: 391) . In a later (2006) formulation, these assumptions are described as explaining "the purpose for which or the reason why an (a first order) assumption is imposed [...] such assumptions elucidate the roles that particular firstorder assumptions play". (Hindriks, 2006: 407) . Starting from these definitions, Hindriks argues that they describe a new framework for analyzing the assumption issue. This allegation is not entirely true though. Mäki made a similar distinction regarding applicability assumptions and early step assumptions (as noted above). He contended that these types of assumptions were meta-statements about the applicability and about the future development of an assumption. That implied that Mäki also implicitly formulated a (restricted at two types of assumption) two-order approach to assumptions. In this view even though Hindriks' statement about the novelty of his approach is somewhat exaggerated, the framework he described is useful for a better understanding of the assumptions issue. In this framework he advocated that "assumptions such as negligibility and applicability are second-order assumptions" (Hindriks, 2006: 407 (Hindriks, 2006: 410) . Stated in more of Hindriks' words, "tractability is a matter of solubility or of the efficiency of a solution. A problem is intractable if it cannot be solved; a problem is more tractable with a certain assumption than without it if it can be solved more easily or efficiently in that case". (Hindriks, 2005: 392) . Hindriks further divides tractability assumptions into theoretical and empirical. "Problem P may be the problem of how to apply a certain theory T to a particular situation. An assumption that is imposed in order to solve such a problem is an empirical tractability problem. An assumption that is needed for solving a problem that is independent from the application of the theory is a theoretical tractability assumption" (Hindriks, 2005: 392) . His argument for the replacement of heuristic assumptions with tractability assumptions is that of rationalizing after the fact: "The process of theory development can rarely be planned this way" (as a second step) [...] The claim that a first-order assumption will turn out to have heuristic value can at most be an educated guess at the time it is imposed. In such cases it will often be more convincing to state that the main reason for imposing the assumption was tractability, perhaps combined with a hope of being able to do without it one day". (Hindriks, 2006: 415,416) . Regarding Mäki's early step assumptions, Hindriks contention was that they missed the heuristic point originally given by Musgrave and that it did not make sense to impose a first order assumption and remove it later. In his words, "it simply does not make sense to say that a first-order assumption is made so that it can be removed later [...] if the assumption is to be relaxed later on, why impose it in the first place? (Hindriks, 2006: 417) . Hindriks' conclusion was that the purpose of explaining why economists imposed false assumptions was better served by his notion of tractability assumptions. In his view, this notion should replace heuristic/early step assumptions. Regarding the problem of falsity from definition, tractability assumptions are forced steps in model building. If Newton had the mathematical apparatus needed for his theory, then he could have done without his "one planet" assumption. So a tractability assumption is a false assumption we hope to remove in the future. Being forced false assumptions, we cannot expect them to be true (as we can with negligibility and applicability assumptions).
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The role of assumptions' effects in building a typology
In this section I have two goals. First, I argue against Mäki-Hindriks' typology of assumptions that the second order assumptions are in most cases inoperable. Second, I argue that the reasons for using a certain assumption are not always specified and it could be more fruitful to concentrate on assumptions' effects in the model world.
Though I am not a trained philosopher, it is my belief that the philosophy of science should be concerned with the operability of its concepts. This is the ground on which I build my critique of Mäki-Hindriks' second order typology of assumptions. I think that concepts should display the property of operability. They should be able to be transformed in a way that allows us to use them in analyzing scientific theories. My contention is a mild one: I won't say that inoperable (or less operable) concepts are useless; I will only say that it is better to work with concepts we are able to use to make sense of scientific practice. I believe that scientific practice, in general, lacks meta-statements about the reason of employing certain assumptions. If we search only for these metastatements we won't be able to conclude much about those reasons 5 . If we want that negligibility, applicability, domain, heuristic, early step or tractability assumptions to matter we must not think of them as only second order assumptions. Returning to Musgrave's example, "A: The government has a balanced budget", I think that there are two distinct ways to avoid the lack of operability of Mäki-Hindriks proposal. The first is returning to Musgrave original method of identifying the function an assumption have without a meta-statement the kind of "assumption A is made because...". The second, and I favour this approach here, is to focus on the effects that a certain assumption have in the model world. So, in the first case if we get lucky and find a meta-statement, then we are done. If the meta-statement is missing, we could employ Musgrave's method. Of course, this method has its shortcomings. Guessing about the reasons is not an easy and exact enterprise. In addition, even though Musgrave (1981) , Mäki (1994) , (2000), (2002), Hindriks (2005) , (2006) talked (implicitly or explicitly) about the functions that assumptions have in a model, one thing was never clear (at least to me) in their analyses. They never talked (at least not explicitly enough) about the possibility of joint functions. An assumption can have more than one function in a model. One can buy apples for their taste and in the same times because of their vitamins. One can employ the same false | 76 assumption by more than one reason. This seems to be neglected by Musgrave-Mäki-Hindriks typologies. Taking an example, from the realm of a neoclassical political science 6 , Niskanen's (1975) budget maximizing assumption from its bureaucracy models, could be interpreted in several ways: First, we could have a function of negligibility: "other reasons for action than budget maximizing can be neglected". Second we could have a function of tractability: "budget maximizing assumption makes the problem tractable". Third we could have joint functions of negligibility and tractability (there is nothing to prevent us to have more than one reason for using a certain assumption). The same goes with the neoclassical principle of maximization. It has tractability functions, but in the same time it might be read as a negligibility assumption. The possibility of joint functions adds a little more mess to the job of identifying the reason for employing unrealistic assumptions. This is why I choose to focus on the obvious effects that assumptions have in a model world. By an effect of an assumption I mean a result that employing a certain assumption could have. This result could be deliberate or non-intentional. Suppose that the only reason to employ the budget maximizing assumption is tractability. In the same time, we will have the effect of negligibility because, for the reasons of tractability, we will disregard any causal power of other (than budget maximization) motivations for action that bureaucrats could have. Scientific practice may not offer enough information to identify functions, but the effects of making a certain assumption are always visible. The most obvious effect that some assumptions achieve in neoclassical models is that of uniformity. This effect is achieved by what I will label as uniformity assumptions. The reasons may be those of tractability or of negligibility or applicability, but the reasons are not my primary interest here.
To further discuss the class of uniformity assumptions, it is necessary to mention another typology which started with Machlup's (1955) paper. This involves a hierarchization of assumptions by their importance. While in Musgrave's taxonomy all assumptions are at the same level of importance, in Machlup-Mäki's (and others) taxonomy, assumptions are ordered by their significance. Machlup distinguished between fundamental assumptions (for example Newton's three laws of motion, or neoclassical economics' rationality postulate) and specific assumptions (for example, that there is a quota for the importation of sugar which is fully utilized). A similar (hierarchical) approach was
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proposed, more recently, by Mäki (1994 Mäki ( ), (2000 . He wrote about types of assumptions and their function and distinguished between core assumptions and peripheral assumptions. Core assumptions "serve to sort out what is believed to be the most central force [...] " (Mäki, 1994: 244] ; for example, Galilei's statement that bodies were attracted by the gravitational field of the Earth, measured by parameter g, or the assumption that agents maximized). Peripheral assumptions "serve to neutralize factors that are not regarded as central or essential to the phenomenon" (Mäki, 1994: 244) ; for example, Galilei's vacuum assumption, or neoclassical economics' perfect divisibility of goods assumption. In (2000) Mäki argued that Musgrave seemed to limit his analysis to peripheral assumptions and that that was not a legitimate move: "both core assumptions and peripheral assumption can in principle serve as negligibility, applicability and early step assumptions 7 " (Mäki, 2000: 329) .
The notions of fundamental/core and peripheral/specific assumptions are useful here in two ways. The first issue is about Hindriks' tractability assumptions. The second, and my main interest here, is about uniformity assumptions. I will discuss them consecutively. Hindriks' (2005) (2006) papers are mainly concerned with explaining why economists use unrealistic assumptions. As I already noted, the reason Hindriks identified, was the new class of tractability assumptions, defined as legitimate forced, hopefully temporary, falsities. The first point I want to make is that if the concept of tractability has in its core the idea of manageability of a problem, then we could think about the possibility of realistic tractability assumptions. From the class of assumptions we could made by reasons of tractability, we should choose realistic ones. Of course if realistic tractability assumptions were the rule of scientific practice, there would have been no reason for Hindriks to write the two papers. My point is just that the concept of tractability is consistent with realisticness of assumptions. This being said, there are two other problems about tractability which I want to address. The first of these is about the meaning of tractability, while the second is about its domain. Regarding the meaning, my first reading of tractability assumptions was in terms of "how to best solve a problem", with the path to solution left empty. My second reading was in terms of "how to solve a problem in a certain way". The path to solution is, in this later reading, specified. I think the second reading is in Hindriks' spirit. All of his examples are about tractability in a certain way. In (2010), Kuorikoski, Lehtinen and Marchionni, explicitly label Hindriks' tractability assumptions as | 78 mathematical tractability assumptions: "Some modeling assumptions are thus introduced only for reasons of mathematical tractability (see Hindriks [2006] )." (Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, Marchionni, 2010: 547) . So Hindriks' tractability assumptions are a subset of what could be called methodological biased tractability. They specify a path to solution. The second problem, connected to the antecedent one, is with tractability assumptions' domain. It is difficult to figure out if these falsities could appear (in Hindriks' view) in the case of core assumptions. Hindriks' definition of tractability and his examples seem to be about peripheral assumptions. I think that there is nothing to prevent us to talk about tractability of the core assumptions. If we make this step (which I am not sure Hindriks did) then we should have the new class of methodologically biased tractability core assumptions and a subset of this class, mathematical tractability core assumptions. By Hindriks' definition, these must be false core assumptions made by reasons of mathematical tractability. The problem, as I see it, is what role these assumptions have in bringing the result. I will modify here Mäki's definition of core assumption from "what is believed to be the most central force" to what is pervasive to models from a discipline. Mäki's definition is clearly a realist one and the realist bias is not of great use here. If core assumptions are ubiquitous assumptions (without commitment to their causal force), then if they happen to be mathematical tractability assumptions also, then they must be totally robust. I will elaborate this idea later.
Turning back to uniformity assumptions, these are effects rather than reasons. When we look at neoclassical economics' (and Public choice theory's) model world, we see different kinds of uniformity. The reasons are less important (even though I think mathematical tractability is the main reason), the important thing is that uniformity is the rule. Building on Machlup-Mäki typology, uniformity may be local or global. By global uniformity assumptions, I have in mind a class of assumption which achieves uniformity across a discipline. My main example of global uniformity assumption is the principal behavioral assumption of neoclassical economics, homo economicus. By homo economicus I refer to an agent who maximizes (formal definition of rationality) his welfare (the self-interest operationalization of the formal definition). This assumption achieves behavioral uniformity across all discipline's domain. By local uniformity assumptions I refer to assumptions that achieve uniformity at local level or at a certain model's level. For example, the budget maximizing assumption achieves uniformity in Niskanen's model world: all bureaucrats are the same. Similarly, the bilateral monopoly assumption achieves uniformity inside the model: the sponsor and the bureau chief are in the same relation across the entire | 79 model world. The reasons may be those of negligibility or of tractability (there is no second step assumption in Niskanen's model), or both but the meta-statements needed to establish this are missing. What is sure is that we have assumptions which achieve uniformity. Global and local uniformity assumptions both achieve context invariance. No matter the context, the discipline world and the model world are uniform. This uniformity is not a bad thing per se, but it might be a problem if the real world is not really uniform. I think uniformity assumptions had better be true. If not, they had better be at least robust. I will develop this idea in the following section of the paper.
Uniformity assumptions: Discussion
Uniformity assumptions are not suspicious per se. To assume, for example, that objects fall as if there were a vacuum is to say that the nature is uniform in respect to this characteristic and it is not a problematic assumption. The same goes, for example, for assuming behavioral uniformity under the individualistic model of prey-predator described by Weisberg and Reisman in (2008) : the model will still display the Voltera property. To assume, as neoclassical economics does, that all individuals are the same: instrumental, self-interested maximizers is, though, another thing. This obvious psychological unrealistic global uniformity assumption seems to be problematic at least in some circumstances which I will clarify in the following few lines.
In (2013) I performed robustness analysis on Niskanen`s models of bureaucracy. I argued there, that those models were sensitive to some of their assumptions i.e. they were not robust with respect to those assumptions. I also argued that those assumptions had a uniformity effect in the model world but I did not fully explore the meaning of uniformity assumptions 8 . Shortly stated, by robustness analysis I meant a non-empirical procedure of building models by incrementally modifying a certain assumption. Starting from that notion, I argued that if the result was constant under different specifications of a certain assumption, then that assumption was in, what I called, the causal core of the model. With these in mind we could return to the problem of the utility maximization global uniformity assumption (and its uniformity operationalized assumptions) from neoclassical economics. If this assumption is in the causal core of model then it had better be true at least in a behavioral way 9 . So the circumstances mentioned above are connected to the 8 This task was assumed here. 9 The distinction made here is between psychological realistic assumptions and behavioral realistic assumptions. If utility maximization is interpreted as a psychological assumption then it is certainly unrealistic. If we only assume that people (no matter their | 80 problem of robustness of results under different uniformity assumptions. If they are not in the causal core of the model then their unrealisticness is unproblematic. A good example is Becker`s 10 (1962) robustness analysis performed on the traditional model of household behavior. Replacing utility maximization with irrational (biased or random) preferences yields the same result. In my terms this means that the assumption was not in the causal core of the model and that its uniformity was not problematic. Concluding, my uniformity assumptions had better be true only when they have causal force in the model. This causal force could be traced by the help of robustness analysis.
